This article analyzes differences in costs, patterns of care, and returns to work between workers treated by either a chiropractor or a physician for an episode of back pain. The article extends prior research by adding controls for unobserved heterogeneity to the models and by using data on health care payments rather than charges. The results imply that chiropractors and physicians are equally effective in treating back pain and that neither group offers a clear advantage in terms of the costs of care or the total costs of a workers' compensation back claim. In effect, chiropractors and physicians are close substitutes as care givers for non-surgical cases of workrelated back pain.
INTRODUCTION
than physicians. Carey et al. (1995) use data on charges to conclude that primary care physicians are the least-cost providers.
The relative costs of health care are not, however, the appropriate comparison for work-related back pain. Workers' compensation insurers and self-insured employers pay health-care costs and disability benefits for persons with work-related injuries. From the payers' viewpoint, relatively costly modes of health care are efficient if the care produces sufficiently large savings in indemnity benefits by reducing durations of work absences.
The authors use data from a workers' compensation insurer (the Zenith Insurance Co.) to compare the sum of health care and indemnity costs for non-surgical back patients treated by chiropractors or physicians. The data refer to approximately 850 closed claims for episodes of back pain that began and ended between 1991 and 1993. The comparison groups are (1) cases treated by a physician but not by a chiropractor and (2) cases treated by a chiropractor but not by a physician.
The authors' measures of health-care costs are payments to providers, rather than health-care charges. Charges are deceptive because payment discounts vary among providers. The authors compare chiropractors' and physicians' pricing, service mix, and service utilization, and describe how each contributes to the differences between the average health-care costs of claimants treated by chiropractors and physicians.
The measures of outcomes are the distribution of injured workers among claim types (medical only, temporary disability only, and permanent partial disability) and the durations of temporary disability claims. The authors estimate an ordered logit model to determine the relative effect of chiropractic treatment on the distribution of claim types, controlling for differences between the characteristics of chiropractic and physician patients. The authors estimate a Weibull duration model to determine the relative effect of chiropractic treatment on durations of work absence within the temporary and permanent disability groups.
One limitation of the study is that severity of injury is unobserved. The problem of unobserved differences between chiropractor and physician patients is addressed by estimating a second set of models in which support points are added to control for the effects of unobserved worker heterogeneity. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first application of the method to the problem of unobserved differences that can include the severity of health conditions. The cost data are unusual because they include both payments for health care and disability benefit payments. The results show that the average total costs of back claims treated by chiropractors are lower than the average total costs of back claims treated by physicians. Part of the cost differential reflects the fact that a relatively large proportion of chiropractic patients are not paid disability benefits because they return to work within California's three-day waiting period. This result is similar to Ebrall's (1992) findings for Australian workers.
The apparent superiority of chiropractic care disappears, however, when the probability of returning to work in less than four days is estimated from multivariate models that control for unobserved heterogeneity in the characteristics of individual workers. These results show no significant differences in the effectiveness of chiropractic and physician care in determining the probability of returning to work within the waiting period. The estimates of the effects of care on durations of work absence for temporary and permanent disability claims do, however, weakly support the conclusion that chiropractors are more effective than physicians in reducing durations of work absence.
MODEL
The authors' model, based on the concept of health capital, consists of (1) a description of the impact of back pain and subsequent health care on a worker's time path of health capital (Grossman, 1972; Muurinen, 1982) and (2) a description of the outcomes of health care and their effects on the total costs of claims.
Health Care and Health Capital
Let H t represent an individual's stock of health capital at time t, that depreciates with age at an increasing rate, δ t . The onset of injury at time t results in a loss of health capital, L t , where L t measures the severity of injury, depicted as a downward shift in the time path of health capital (Figure 1 ). Assume, for simplicity, that an injury does not affect the natural rate of depreciation of health capital.
FIGURE 1 Changes in the Stock of Health Capital Following a Back Injury
Losses of health capital can be restored, to some extent, by consuming health care. Let I t represent the amount of health capital restored, and H t+1 the stock of health capital in the time period after the benefits of health care are exhausted. Then, the stock of health capital at time t+1 can be written as
In Figure 1 , the stock of health capital in time period t+1 (H t+1 ) is less than the expected stock of health capital had an injury not occurred, H * t+1
-H t+1 is the injury-related loss of health capital that is not restored by health care (that is, L t -I t ).
Increments of health capital (I t ) are produced by combining health-care services (S) and patients' time (M). Let S c and S p be two vectors of services representing chiro-
t practic-and physician-directed care, respectively. Then, the health capital production function is
where each input is assumed to have a positive marginal product and to exhibit diminishing returns. The vectors S c and S p include some, but not all, of the same services because chiropractors are not licensed to perform all the services provided by physicians.
Physicians and chiropractors both use rest, heat/ice therapy, and over-the-counter, anti-inflammatory drugs to treat back pain. Physicians are more likely to use imaging techniques, such as CT and MRI scans, to evaluate back pain and more likely to provide prescription medications. Chiropractic treatments rely more on X-rays and use spinal manipulation or adjustment as their core treatment. (See Manga (1993) for a comprehensive review of chiropractic methods of treatment.) Physicians and chiropractors often direct patients who are not responding to therapy to medical or surgical specialists. Physicians often also refer patients to physical therapy, while chiropractors perform most of these services themselves. Because referrals are ordered by the primary provider, such services are included in the service vector of the referring chiropractor or physician.
Increments in health capital resulting from health-care services are produced at a cost C H c = S c P c for chiropractor patients and C H p = S p P p for physician patients, where P c and P p are price vectors corresponding to the vectors of services S c and S p . Among claims that do not involve indemnity payments (that is, "medical only" claims), the least-cost provider is the one who minimizes C H . Among lost time cases, the appropriate criterion for evaluating providers' effectiveness is the sum of health-care costs and indemnity payments.
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The next section describes two measures of the outcomes of work-related back pain that affect the costs of lost-time claims: (1) the distribution of claim types and (2) the duration of indemnity benefits.
Outcomes
Claim Distribution The distribution of indemnity costs is indirectly related to durations of work absence and to the incidence of permanent impairments. In California, the imposition of a three-day "waiting period" creates a group of "medical only" (MO) claimants who miss from one to three days of work but receive no indemnity benefits. Thus, one criterion for the comparison of chiropractors and physicians is the proportion of their patients with medical only claims.
Workers who are absent four or more days receive temporary disability payments, which continue until they return to work or receive a permanent impairment rating. The workers who receive temporary disability benefits but return to work without permanent impairments are "temporary disability only" (TDO) claims.
If an injury causes an irreducible loss of health capital, temporary disability benefits are replaced by a fixed amount, called a "permanent partial disability" (PPD) benefit, paid without regard to subsequent work absences or employment. Because all PPD workers complete spells of temporary disability, they receive temporary disability payments, which vary with the duration of work absence, as well as permanent disability payments. Permanent total disability claims occur infrequently and are excluded from the data.
Temporary disability payments, C T , are determined by a worker's pre-injury wage and the amount of lost work time. That is,
where b T (W) is the weekly benefit rate, a function of the worker's average pre-injury wage, W, and D is the duration of the lost-time claim in weeks. The benefit rate increases with the wage rate for values of W such that W min < W < W max , otherwise, the benefit rate is fixed at the statutory minimum, b T (W min ), or maximum, b T (W max ). Permanent partial disability payments, C P , are a function of the worker's pre-injury wage and severity of permanent impairment as rated by the state workers' compensation board. It is assumed that severity, as measured by the permanent impairment rating, r, is a linear transformation of the workers' post-injury stock of health capital, that is, r = 1 -(H t+1 /H
* t+1
). Then,
where C P = 0 if r = 0 (MO and TDO claims).
As shown above, health care can reduce indemnity costs by increasing the probability of returning to work within three days, or by decreasing the probability of permanent impairment. Both effects can be analyzed by comparing the distribution of claims among the MO, TDO, and PPD groups, controlling for factors other than health care, that influence the post-injury stock of health capital. Health care can also generate savings in indemnity costs by reducing the durations of work absence within claim types. This outcome is described next.
Durations of Work Absence
Restoring the ability to work is an objective of health care, but being able to work does not guarantee employment Worrall, 1985, 1991; Fenn, 1981; Johnson, Baldwin, and Butler, 1996; Johnson, Butler, and Baldwin, 1995; Johnson and Ondrich, 1990) . Restoring the ability to work, for example, does not guarantee that a worker is willing to return to work; nor does restoring the ability to work guarantee that an injured worker receives a job offer. Some workers delay returns to work because of the disincentive effects of indemnity payments, and injured workers with relatively long work absences often find their time-of-accident employers unwilling to offer employment . Employers may, for example, hire replacement workers or eliminate a worker's job because of reduced demand for labor.
To control for the influence of labor demand factors, worker incentives, and other non-health-related determinants of returns to work, duration of work absence, D, is expressed as
where H t+1 is the post-injury stock of health capital, and K is a vector of variables representing workers' human capital characteristics and economic incentives that influence returns to work. Among workers who are absent for four days or more and have not yet been awarded permanent disability benefits, any reduction in lost work days attributed to health care represents savings in temporary disability benefits.
Summary of Outcome Measures
The authors consider the following outcomes:
1. The effect of health care on the probability a worker returns to work within the waiting period (probability of an MO claim).
2. The effect of health care on the incidence of permanent impairments (probability of a PPD claim).
3. The effect of health care on durations of temporary disability benefits among workers who are absent four days or more. The first two outcomes are estimated using an ordered logit model of the distribution of claims types, and the last outcome is estimated with a Weibull duration model. The authors' methods are described next.
METHODS

Controlling for Unobservable Differences in Severity
The most difficult problem in any study of back pain is the absence of objective measures of severity. The problem is exemplified by the federal practice guidelines for back pain, developed by a panel of national experts. The guidelines state that "The examination [of a patient with back pain] is mostly subjective since patient response or interpretation is required for all parts except reflex testing and circumferential measurements for atrophy" (USDHHS, 1994, p. 3).
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Two approaches to control are used, as much as possible, for unobserved differences in the severity of back pain. The first control for differences in severity between the patients of chiropractors or physicians is to exclude surgical cases because chiropractors are not licensed to perform surgery. The prevalence of back surgery in the data is relatively high when compared to most current practice guidelines, and it could be argued that cases where surgery was inappropriate would have benefitted more from non-surgical care. The determination of whether or not surgery is appropriate is, however, beyond the scope of this study.
The authors also control for unobserved worker characteristics that may influence the severity and outcome of a workers' compensation claim. The location parameter of the duration distribution, and the intercepts of the claim type function, are as-2 Even clinical measures of the spinal abnormalities that can cause back problems are poor predictors of back pain (Frank et al., 1995) . Subjective severity measures, such as the Roland scale, must be administered at onset to be useful and vary with unobservable differences in patients' tolerance for pain (Roland and Morris, 1983) . The objectivity of self-reports is particularly suspect for litigated compensation claims because benefits may depend on ratings of the severity of the condition. Nevertheless, self-reports collected at time of onset would have been useful if they had been included in the data.
sumed to vary with observed characteristics and unobserved worker heterogeneity Singer, 1984a, 1984b) . 3 This approach allows the authors to estimate different intercept values for different groups of workers. The different intercepts control for unobserved differences in the types of patients treated by chiropractors and physicians, including differences in the average severity of injury.
Controlling for Selection Effects
The California workers' compensation law allows employers to select a provider for the first 30 days of treatment, suggesting that patients' preferences among providers are not relevant. Not all employers select providers for their injured workers, however, and workers who file pre-injury notifications can designate their provider of choice. The authors have, therefore, included controls for worker selection effects in the models, although selection effects are expected to be quite weak.
Patient satisfaction with chiropractic care is analyzed in a number of studies but much less is known about the factors underlying a patient's decision to choose chiropractic care. A recent study of patients with back pain is used as a guide to instruments for provider choice (Carey et al., 1995) . The study shows that, all else equal, persons with household incomes exceeding $20,000 are more likely to select a chiropractor than are lower income persons, and younger persons are more likely to select a chiropractor than are older persons. To control for income differences a binary variable is included in the models that identifies workers who live in a ZIP Code region where per capita income is greater than $20,000, the highest quintile of the income distribution. The high correlation between income and health insurance coverage, which may have affected Carey's (1995) comparisons, is not an issue for the analysis because workers' compensation claimants receive first dollar coverage for health care.
Five binary variables for claimants' locations control for regional differences in practice patterns and in chiropractors' share of health-care markets. The regions include the cities and nearby suburbs of Fresno, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Diego, and San Francisco. Thus, the models include variables for age, income, and region as instruments for selection effects.
Claim Type Function
Ordered logit model with controls for unobserved heterogeneity. An ordered logit model (Greene, 1993 ) is used to estimate the effect of chiropractic or physician care on the probability that a back claim is closed as a medical only, temporary disability only, or permanent partial disability claim. To control for differences in severity and other unobservables, the authors estimate a "random effects" ordered logit specification, which allows multiple intercept values between each outcome.
Assume the distribution of claim types (MO, TDO, PPD) is determined by a latent variable, y * i , a continuous, increasing measure of disability following a back injury, such that,
where X is a vector of variables that determine the extent of work disability and β β β β β is a corresponding vector of coefficients. Although y * i is unobservable, the authors do observe the categorical variable, y i , such that
where the number of support points are determined empirically, as suggested by Singer (1984a, 1984b) in their analyses of unobserved heterogeneity in duration models. Assume the error term, ε i , has a logistic distribution and let Φ denote its cumulative distribution function. Then, the intercept values (θ 1j , θ 2j ) and associated probabilities (P 1j , P 2j ) are estimated along with other parameters of the model by maximizing the likelihood function,
. Estimates from the model with multiple support points are compared to estimates from a model with one support point. The model with one support point assumes that all workers have the same intercept values which, given their socioeconomic characteristics and the nature of their injuries, lead them to "be selected" into one of the three claim types. 4 The model with multiple support points allows the thresholds for moving from one claim type to another to vary with unobserved worker characteristics. 4 In the model with one support point, the categorical variable, y i , is defined as
, where θ 1 and θ 2 are unknown constants. Then, the log likelihood function of the model is , corresponds to L t -I t , the loss of health capital not completely restored by health care within the three-day waiting period. The extent of residual impairment following a work-related injury is determined by the nature and severity of injury, medical care services received, and patients' time devoted to recuperation. Thus, the vector X i includes variables to control for nature of injury, chiropractic or physician care, worker characteristics that influence the effectiveness of health care, and the costs of workers' time invested in recuperation.
The workers' compensation system was designed for measurable insults to the body caused by workplace accidents. Few cases of back pain meet these criteria because back pain is a prevalent, often chronic, condition whose origins are often uncertain. There is less uncertainty concerning the work-related origin of back pain in cases accompanied by other measurable injuries (contusions, lacerations, and so forth) or associated with traumatic accidents (such as vehicle rollovers) than in cases where self-reported pain is the only symptom. One can argue that "lifting a box" is an accident because it is classified as such if it results in a workers' compensation claim. The authors suggest the classification is more a function of the origins of workers' compensation and the wording of workers' compensation laws than an accurate representation of a traumatic accident that causes injuries.
The authors construct a binary variable, "well-defined injury," to distinguish back cases with accompanying measurable symptoms from back pain based only on selfreports of pain. The variable equals one if a back claim involves an injury to the spinal cord; an accompanying measurable injury, such as a burn, dislocation, or fracture; or a specific accident, such as contact with chemicals, vehicle collision, or explosion. The variable is included in the authors' models to control for possible differences in the types of injuries treated by physicians and chiropractors.
The vector of health-care services typical of chiropractic treatment (S c ) is represented by a binary variable identifying workers treated by chiropractors but not by physicians. Worker characteristics include age, sex, and weeks of work experience. The authors hypothesize that health care is more effective in returning experienced workers to their jobs than less experienced workers, all else being equal, because workers with more experience are better able to adapt the work environment to the residual effects of an impairment. The cost of workers' time is measured by the pre-injury wage.
5 Instruments for provider choice (age, income, region) are included to control for differences between the types of patients who choose physician or chiropractic care.
Duration Function
To estimate the determinants of claim duration, let D be a random variable representing the duration of temporary disability benefits in weeks. Assume D has a Weibull distribution, described by two parameters, α and γ, where α represents the shape of the duration distribution and γ its location. 6 The probability density and distribution functions of claim duration can be written as f (Dγ,α) and F(Dγ,α) .
The authors assume α is constant but allow γ to vary with observed worker characteristics and unobserved differences in severity such that
where Y is a vector of characteristics that influence the location of the duration distribution and g is a vector of parametric weights assumed constant across workers. The vector µ i captures unobserved individual differences between the characteristics of chiropractor or physician patients. The number of values of µ i , as well as the probability mass of each value, is determined empirically by increasing the number of support points until additional points are no longer statistically significant. Previous studies (Butler and Worrall, 1991; Trussell and Richards, 1985) imply that relatively few points of increase are necessary in duration models.
The exponential form of the location parameter function restricts the predicted value of γ to the positive real domain. In this case, the log likelihood function is
and the parameters α, µ, and g can be estimated by maximum likelihood techniques.
The authors estimate separate duration functions for TDO and PPD claims because the end of temporary disability benefits has different meanings for the TDO and PPD groups. Temporary benefits end for TDO claims when the worker returns to work. Temporary benefits end for PPD claims when a worker is assigned a permanent disability rating; PPD benefits are then paid regardless of a worker's employment status.
The vector Y includes the same "type of injury" variable, worker characteristics, instruments for provider selection, and chiropractor variable as the claim type function. Economic incentives are measured by the ratio of expected temporary disability benefits to the pre-injury wage, the "replacement rate."
6 The shape parameter of the Weibull distribution is directly linked to the type of duration dependence exhibited by the data. Estimates of α < 1 imply a declining hazard rate (that is, a declining rate of exit from workers' compensation as claims lengthen); estimates of α < 1 imply an increasing hazard rate (that is, an increasing rate of exit as claims lengthen).
Following a referee's suggestion, the authors attempted to relax the Weibull assumption of a constantly increasing or constantly decreasing hazard rate by fitting the generalized gamma distribution to the data. The authors also attempted to generalize the types of heterogeneity considered by employing mixture distrubutions (such as the Burr-12 distribution for the Weibull). In either case, the number of parameters to be estimated increases, and attempts to fit the data to these models resulted in severe collinearity messages and non-convergence. The authors are not sure that these higher dimension distributions do not fit the data. One explanation for non-convergence may be that the sample is too homogeneous, in the sense that the authors have limited the analysis to non-surgical, low-back claims in one state. This may be an important shortcoming that future research should address.
RESULTS
Data
The data are California workers' compensation back claims, from the Zenith Insurance Co., that opened and closed between October 1991 and August 1993. The sample is restricted to closed claims to eliminate incomplete episodes of back pain. Surgical cases, cases with missing data, cases that did not receive care from either a physician or chiropractor, cases that received care from both types of providers, and permanent total disability cases, of which there are two, are excluded.
After exclusions, there are 844 cases in the sample, 95 percent of which are sprains or strains. Approximately 80 percent of the cases are treated by physicians but not by chiropractors, and 20 percent by chiropractors but not by physicians. The data include 230 medical-only claims (27 percent of sample), 275 temporary disability only claims (33 percent), and 339 permanent partial disability claims (40 percent). The proportion of claims in the PPD category is substantially higher than in many other states, reflecting the practice in some regions of California of classifying a high percentage of back cases as low severity, permanent impairments to facilitate quick closure of the claims. Table 1 describes sample statistics. The proportion of chiropractor patients who return to work within the three-day waiting period is nearly twice as high as the corresponding proportion of physician patients (45 percent versus 23 percent). Average total claim costs (health-care costs plus indemnity costs) for all claim types are $1,526 for chiropractor patients and $1,875 for physician patients. It appears, as Manga et al. (1993) suggest, that chiropractors are the lowest cost providers for the treatment of back pain. The unanswered question is the extent to which the differences in costs reflect differences between chiropractic and physician care, or differences in the characteristics of their patients. The next sections describe the cost differences attributable to differences in chiropractic and physician treatment and estimate cost differences standardized for observable and unobservable differences between the patients in the two comparison groups.
Health-Care Costs
Tables 2A-2C describe utilization rates and payments, by claim type and provider, for each of the eight health-care services most frequently provided to workers' compensation back patients, and a miscellaneous category of other services. The first column reports the mean number of units of a service provided per patient (corresponding to the vectors of services S c and S p and including patients who did not receive the service). The second column reports average payments per unit of service, and the third column reports average total payments. Average payments per unit of service differ across provider types, but the finding does not necessarily indicate price discrimination because the service categories include similar but not identical bundles of services.
Chiropractors use approximately twice as many office visits, and slightly more physical medicine procedures, per patient than do physicians. Physicians, on the other hand, use more drugs, laboratory tests, and other services than chiropractors, and, except for physical medicine procedures, a physician's average costs per unit of service are higher. The differences in unit costs reflect differences in the nature of the services provided by chiropractors and physicians because pricing is regulated by California's fee schedule. The drugs provided to chiropractor patients, for example, are less costly than the drugs provided to physician patients because chiropractic patients receive non-prescription drugs.
Average total health-care costs are essentially equal for chiropractors and physicians across the entire claim distribution ($1,044 versus $1,075), because chiropractors' comparatively high average costs for office visits and physical medicine procedures are offset by physicians' comparatively high average costs for auxiliary services, prescription drugs, and tests. There are, however, differences between chiropractors and physicians in the average costs of care for workers within claim categories (Table 1) . Chiropractors are paid approximately 20 percent more than physicians for treating an average MO ($961 versus $801), or TDO ($1,148 versus $958) claim. It is only among PPD claims that the average cost of chiropractic care is lower than the average cost of physician care ($1,062 versus $1,304).
The health-care data describe differences in the treatments used by chiropractors and physicians, and the effect of those differences on health-care costs. The next step is to analyze how the differences in treatments affect indemnity costs by influencing the distribution of claim types and the duration of temporary disability benefits.
Distribution of Claim Types
Estimates of the determinants of claim types from the ordered logit models are reported in Table 3 . The sign of each coefficient indicates the effect of a variable on the probability of a PPD claim; the variable has the opposite effect on the probability of an MO claim. The positive sign of the coefficient for the Los Angeles region in Column 2, for example, indicates that workers in Los Angeles have a higher probability of PPD claims, and a lower probability of MO claims, than workers in Sacramento (the omitted region). The direction of the effect of a variable on the probability of a TDO claim cannot be inferred directly from the sign of its coefficient.
Column 2 presents results from a model with no controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The results show that provider type (that is, the vector of health-care services provided by a chiropractor or physician), nature of injury, and regional effects are significant determinants of the claim distribution. Pre-injury wage is also significant but its coefficient is small.
The significant negative coefficient for chiropractic services indicates that chiropractic care increases the probability of an MO claim and decreases the probability of a PPD claim relative to physician care. The results change substantially, however, when controls for unobserved heterogeneity are added to the model.
Estimates from an ordered logit model with two points of support are given in the third column of Table 3 . In the original specification, two additional intercept values were added to the specification, estimating the original intercepts θ 1 and θ 2 , and, for a second unspecified injury risk group, k, additional intercepts θ 1k and θ 2k . The authors encountered severe collinearity problems that seem to be associated with the second intercept value and the dummy variable identifying claims from the Los An-geles region. The authors believe this reflects the fact that an unusually large number of the permanent partial disability claims come from the Los Angeles region.
The authors tried several alternatives to reduce the collinearity of the estimators. The third column in Table 3 presents results under the assumption that heterogeneity can be modeled as shifts in the θ 1 term. The authors estimate θ 1 and θ 1k along with their associated probabilities, then assume that the intercept shift between θ 2 and θ 2k within the two subpopulations is the same. In other words, the difference between θ 1 and θ 1k equals the difference between θ 2 and θ 2k . The model provides a statistically signifi- Source: Claims data from Zenith Insurance Co., closed claims 1991-93. Note: Intercepts are also included in the model but are not reported here. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels for the model with heterogeneity controls are determined from log likelihood ratio tests. *** = significant at the .01 level or better, ** = significant at the .05 level, * = significant at the .10 level.
cant improvement over the model without controls for heterogeneity, with a significance level of better than one percent. 7 Models were also estimated with three and four points of support, but the multicollinearity problems were only exacerbated and there was no statistical improvement (at the 10 percent level) over the model reported in Column 3.
The model with two support points predicts the observed claim distribution fairly accurately. The predicted distribution is 27 percent MO claims (compared to 27 percent actual), 32 percent TDO claims (compared to 33 percent actual) and 40 percent PPD claims (compared to 40 percent actual).
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In Column 2, the standard errors are reported from a package regression model (the LOGISTIC procedure in SAS) whereas the standard errors in Column 3 are computed from a nonlinear optimization routine (the MODEL procedure in SAS). Both procedures yield the same optimization values for the estimated parameters in the one support point model, but the standard errors differ. The estimates of standard errors for models that use the MODEL procedure are typically very large, so the authors use log-likelihood ratio tests (χ 2 with one degree of freedom) to compute statistical significance for the model with heterogeneity controls.
The coefficient of the chiropractor dummy is positive but not significantly different from zero in the model that includes controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The results imply that differences in the claim distribution of chiropractor and physician patients can be attributed to unobserved differences in the characteristics of the patients they treat. The authors assume that one of the unobserved differences is the severity of injuries.
The estimated chiropractor coefficient is sensitive to changes in the form of heterogeneity controls. The coefficient was seldom larger than 40 percent of the value reported in Column 2 (no heterogeneity controls) in the models that the authors estimated. The estimates from other models were, however, often larger in magnitude and of opposite sign than the coefficient reported in Column 3. Clearly, larger data sets that support a more definitive treatment of unobserved heterogeneity would increase the authors' confidence in estimators such as those reported in Column 3.
The sign and significance level of the binary variable identifying males is also affected by heterogeneity controls. The gender variable is insignificant without the heterogene-7 The authors also experimented with heterogeneity controls in which they assumed there were seven distinct groups with separate, known intercepts, for which the authors estimated the probability density by assuming that the probability parameters follow a cubic polynomial. This smoothing reduced the dimensionality of the problem (necessary to deal with the collinearity problems) but even after employing extensive sets of intercept values the authors could not improve the fit of the likelihood function reported in Table 3 , column 3. 8 The estimated threshold values in the model with no controls for heterogeneity are θ 1 = -2.192 and θ 2 = -1.746. The estimated values for the heterogeneity model are θ 1a = -17.925 and θ 2a = -15.068, with an associated estimated probability of 37.5 percent, and θ 1b = 198.790 and θ 2b = 201.647, with an associate estimated probability of 62.5 percent. When the model with heterogeneity is used to predict the probability of each claim type based on claimant characteristics, there is considerable variation in the predicted probability of being in the TDO or PPD groups, but claimant characteristics have virtually no impact on the likelihood of being an MO claim.
ity controls. When unobserved differences between men and women are held constant, men have a lower probability of PPD claims, and a higher probability of MO claims, than women, but the estimate is only significant at the 10 percent level.
Other notable differences between the estimates with and without heterogeneity controls are the magnitudes of some of the geographical dummy variables. The Los Angeles coefficient is significantly larger in the model with heterogeneity controls, suggesting that the likelihood of becoming a permanent partial disability claim is greater in the Los Angeles area than is indicated by the model without heterogeneity controls. Chiropractors treat a small proportion of Los Angeles patients, relative to the other regions, suggesting the possibility that the geographic results mask differences in the outcomes of treatment. It is not possible, however, to distinguish the treatment effects within a region from other regional influences. Average PD ratings in Los Angeles are, for example, relatively low compared to other regions, suggesting that Los Angeles back claims are more likely to be closed as low-severity PPD claims for administrative reasons. The Fresno coefficient in the model with controls for heterogeneity is more negative, suggesting that Fresno workers are more likely to be MO claims than is indicated by the no heterogeneity model. Other variables, such as weekly wage and well-defined injury, are insignificant when heterogeneity controls are added to the model.
The estimates imply that the most important factors determining the distribution of claim types are gender, unobserved differences in the nature of back injuries, and regional variations. The results imply that when patient heterogeneity is controlled, there are no significant differences in the effectiveness of chiropractic and physician treatment in returning workers to a job within the waiting period. The next question is the relative effect of chiropractic and physician care on durations of work absence within the TDO and PPD groups.
Duration of Temporary Disability Benefits
Coefficient estimates of the duration function are reported in Table 4 . The authors estimated models with up to four points of support, but only the first two points of increase significantly improved model fit. Columns 1 and 3 present results with one support point (the standard Weibull model without heterogeneity). Columns 2 and 4 present results with two support points, so that differences in severity of injury and other unobservables are effectively described with two "heterogeneity-types," after controlling for other socio-demographic variables in the analysis.
The vector of socioeconomic variables is jointly significant at better than the 1 percent level in all four models, although the standard errors appear to be relatively high in Columns 2 and 4. 9 Again, significance tests for the parameter estimates in the models with controls for unobserved heterogeneity are based on log-likelihood ratio tests (χ 2 with one degree of freedom).
The chiropractor variable is marginally significant (ten percent level) in the TDO model but not significant in the model for PPD claims. Thus, the results with controls for unobserved heterogeneity provide weak support for the contention that chiro-9 The log-likelihood ratio tests indicate that the independent variables are jointly significant in both models with controls for heterogeneity. Source: Claims data from Zenith Insurance Co., closed claims 1991-93. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sacramento is the omitted region. In both models tests of the null hypothesis that the independent variables are jointly insignificant are rejected at better than the .0001 level. ***=sig-nificant at the .01 level or better, **=significant at the .05 level, *=significant at the .10 level.
10 Because only 6 percent of the back claims are for "well defined injuries," the authors excluded the injury dummy from the models to see if it changed our estimates of the effect of chiropractic care. Neither the chiropractor dummy nor any of the other coefficients were significantly affected.
practors are more effective than physicians in reducing durations of work absence among TDO claims. There is no significant difference in the effects of chiropractic or physician treatment on the duration of temporary disability benefit payments for the PPD group.
10
The replacement rate has a significant positive influence on durations of work absence for TDO (1 percent level) and PPD (5 percent level) claims. That is, the greater the expected workers' compensation temporary disability benefits relative to the preinjury wage, the longer the duration of benefits. The estimated coefficients are stable across specifications, and the results are consistent with numerous studies reporting strong work disincentives associated with workers' compensation indemnity benefits (see, for example, Fenn, 1981; Johnson and Ondrich, 1990) .
Regional location and household income also have significant effects on the duration of temporary disability benefits. Workers in Pleasanton have longer average durations of temporary disability than workers in other regions. Among PPD claims, workers from higher income areas, and workers from San Diego and Fresno, also have longer average durations on temporary disability.
As seen in the results for the claim type distribution, gender is only significant (at the 10 percent level) in the duration model for PPD claims when controls for unobservable worker heterogeneity are included. Among workers with permanent impairments, men have shorter average durations of temporary disability than women.
CONCLUSIONS
The sum of health-care and indemnity costs for an average work-related back claim is lower for chiropractor patients than for physician patients because more chiropractor patients return to work within the three-day waiting period, and those who are TDO claims return to work more quickly. One possible explanation for the difference is that chiropractic treatment returns injured workers to their jobs more quickly by providing continuing care after the workers return. Another possible explanation is that chiropractors treat less severe back injuries, on average, than do physicians.
There are no objective measures of severity for a typical case of back pain. The authors use well-established econometric techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the models we use to study the outcomes of chiropractic and physician care. The authors assume that differences in severity of injury is one of the factors captured by the heterogeneity controls.
Most of the differences between the outcomes of chiropractic and physician treatment are insignificant when heterogeneity is controlled. There is no significant difference between the claim distributions of the two groups of patients and only marginally significant differences in the durations of claims. The authors do find important differences in the patterns of treatment for back patients treated by physicians and chiropractors. The analysis does not consider the appropriateness of care relative to practice guidelines or other absolute standards for either type of provider.
This article analyzes differences in costs, patterns of care, and returns to work between workers treated by either a chiropractor or a physician for an episode of back pain. The article extends prior research by adding controls for unobserved heterogeneity to the models and by using data on health-care payments rather than charges. The results imply that chiropractors and physicians are equally effective in treating back pain and that neither group offers a clear advantage in terms of the costs of care or the total costs of a workers' compensation back claim. In effect, chiropractors and physicians are close substitutes as care givers for non-surgical cases of workrelated back pain.
The analysis of the conflicting claims for chiropractic or physician treatment of workrelated back pain would, however, benefit from a larger sample and from clinical data on severity collected at time of onset. The authors are conducting a study of physician and chiropractic care, the "Arizona State University Healthy Back Study," that combines self reports of severity at onset with information on the treatment and outcomes of back pain for the following year. The outcomes include workers' post-injury productivity, duration of work absences, and costs to employers. The results will inform employers about the potential savings of alternative treatments for back pain and provide information on opportunities for reducing the direct and indirect costs of work-related back injuries without adversely affecting the health of injured workers.
